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When Playing the Game of College Sports,
You Should Not Be Playing "Monopoly"
Lisa M. Bianchi & Bryan S. Gadol
I. INTRODUCTION
College sports appeal to a variety of individuals for a multi-
tude of reasons. From ambitious young athletes and their loyal
fans packing the stadiums, to television producers and sponsors
who bring the games into people's homes, society as a whole has a
special affinity for collegiate competition. Associated with any
competition, however, is the need for rules and regulations to es-
tablish a cohesive structure, designate uniform rules, and promul-
gate fairness.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)' is the
organization responsible for setting the standards for collegiate
athletics throughout the country. The NCAA tries to establish a
balance between the athletic and educational experiences of stu-
dent athletes. Every college and university becomes a member if
they wish to compete in intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA func-
tions as a centralized regulatory authority with the power not only
to set its own standards, but also to enforce its rules through a
variety of sanctions. Sanctions range from simple reprimands to
multiyear bans from competition.2
The NCAA's ability to regulate every facet of college sports
has far-reaching consequences. For example, the NCAA may ap-
1 The NCAA is a national association of universities and colleges that has "adopted
and promulgated playing rules, standards for amateurism, standards for academic eligibil-
ity, regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic
squads and coaching staff." National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984) (hereinafter Board of Regents). The NCAA national
headquarters are located at 6201 College Boulevard in Overland Park, Kansas. Steve
Rushin, Inside the Moat, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 3, 1997, at 68.
2 In 1985, the NCAA placed SMU on three years' probation, stripping the school of 45
football scholarships for rule violations. Jim Lassiter, Alumni Bucks Are Creating Big
Problems, THE DAILY-OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 26, 1985, available in 1985 WL 4385954. The
NCAA "handed the University of Miami's football program a post season bowl ban and
three years of probation." Alan Schmadtke, NCAA Clears FSU Football Program of Major
Rules Violation, FORT LAUDERDALE SuN-SENTINEL, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al. "The [University
of Washington] Huskies were outlawed from bowl games for two years while Miami, Texas
A&M and Alabama lost one year. Washington lost revenue from TV games for one season
and was limited to four appearances in another while Miami lost no revenues or exposure."
Blaine Newham, Recent Penalties Against Peers Stoke UW's Fire, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec.
7, 1995, at C1.
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ply sanctions at its discretion that potentially could destroy an en-
tire athletic program. Teams in contention for a national
championship in a major sport generate enormous revenues for
their universities. In addition, the NCAA allows universities to
make money that might otherwise go in part to the players. The
problem is the student athletes are not offering their services in a
free market, unlike professional athletes, but to a cartel that sub-
stantially restricts the compensation for their services. In gen-
eral, the same package of benefits is offered to recruit athletes,
while the universities reap tremendous revenues and prestige
from their athletic performances.' Instead of receiving high-
priced contracts, exceptional college athletes receive a tradeoff.
Schools supply scholarships and act as a de facto farm system to
catapult players to professional sports instead of compensating
the individual athletes for their performance. However, with con-
trol should come responsibility. Any time a nongovernmental or-
ganization completely controls an industry, the potential for abuse
is dramatically increased. In the case of the NCAA, the organiza-
tion serves as the investigator, judge, jury and executioner.
In recent years, both the Pacific 10 Conference (Pac-10)4 and
the NCAA have been attacked on antitrust grounds. The applica-
tion of antitrust laws to associational agreements among the
NCAA member colleges and universities has created much contro-
versy. The courts balance the procompetitive aspects of organized
collegiate competition against the restraints imposed by extensive
regulation. Courts recognize the NCAA is necessary to bring ama-
teur sports to the market and give deference to its decisions
accordingly.
In Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference,5 former and current Uni-
versity of Washington (UW) football players sued the conference
alleging violations of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' after the
NCAA sanctioned the university for rule violations. The sanctions
imposed included a two-year ban from college football bowl games.
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington summarily dismissed the action because the players
3 The University of Michigan athletic department revenue for football in 1995-96 was
$20,731,000. David Shepardson and Wayne Wooley, U-M Gridiron Success Felt Far Be-
yond the Football Field, THE DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 8, 1997, at Al. It was estimated that an
Orange Bowl game against Notre Dame could make the University of Miami as much as $3
million profit. Sports, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5964098.
4 The Pac-10 is a member institution of the NCAA. Its constituents are 10 western
universities: the University of Washington, Washington State University, University of
Oregon, Oregon State University, University of California, Berkeley, Stanford University,
University of California, Los Angeles, University of Southern California, Arizona State
University and the University of Arizona. Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d
1315, 1317 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
5 Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1317.
6 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1996).
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failed to show the NCAA's procompetitive objectives could be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner. The court
held the sanctions did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade under § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit considered if the sanctions imposed were dispropor-
tionate to the rule violations and thus constituted an unreasona-
ble restraint. The court examined the restraint at issue and
balanced whether the procompetitive objectives outweighed the
restraint's harm. Ultimately, the court decided that, although
there was a contract, combination, or conspiracy affecting inter-
state commerce, the players failed to provide sufficient evidence
the Pac-10 objectives could have been achieved in a "substantially
less restrictive manner.""
The Ninth Circuit and other courts have recognized the neces-
sity of the NCAA to bring amateur sports to the market. How-
ever, the courts have been unwilling to provide a forum to rectify
problems with the current organization without legislative direc-
tion. Part I of this note focuses on the history of the antitrust laws
as applied to the NCAA. Emphasis will be on the NCAA by anal-
ogy, since the Pac-10 operates as a division member of the organi-
zation. Part II examines the facts and opinion of Hairston. Part
III analyzes the rule of reason approach as applied to NCAA sanc-
tions. The courts' current preference is to focus on the procompeti-
tive effects of the extensive NCAA regulations instead of on the
restraints imposed. Hairston illustrates the judicial reluctance to
closely scrutinize the powerful role of the NCAA. This note con-
cludes with a description of the problems associated with this type
of judicial deference and proposes athletes with legitimate claims
should have antitrust legal recourse to voice their grievances.
II. ANTITRUST LAWS AND THE NCAA
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act and Sports
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted to protect trade and
commerce against monopolies. Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act outlaws contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that re-
sult in an unreasonable restraint of trade in interstate commerce.9
Every contract, to a greater or lesser extent, restrains trade.
However, in order to establish a claim under § 1 of the Act, plain-
tiffs must demonstrate the existence of a contract, combination, or
conspiracy which unreasonably restrains trade. An essential step
7 Hairston v. Pacific-10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1495, 1496 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
8 Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1318-19.
9 Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1996).
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in antitrust analysis is to determine whether an alleged violation
constitutes a per se1° rule of illegality or falls into the rule of rea-
son11 category. In a rule of reason analysis, the fact-finder exam-
ines the restraint at issue to determine whether the restraint's
harm to competition outweighs the restraint's procompetitive
effects. 12
A restraint of trade is per se unreasonable, 13 as a matter of
law, for any contract or agreement that involves price fixing,14 hor-
izontal division of the market, 15 vertical price fixing,"6 group boy-
cotts,17 or tying arrangements."5 Per se violations are inherently
pernicious and considered illegal by their very nature. Typically,
these types of agreements are found to be anticompetitive without
conducting any further inquiry into the industry and its prac-
tices.19 If an activity does not constitute a per se violation, the
rule of reason approach is applied.
Although distinguishing between per se and rule of reason
cases may seem clear, problems arise in applying labels to prac-
tices which do not clearly fit into either category, or which are
novel. Courts recognize that, if § 1 of the Sherman Act is read
literally, all private contracts could be outlawed.2 ° Therefore, in
non per se cases, the rule of reason analysis is applied to scruti-
nize the impact on competition to determine if the restriction is
valid. In these cases, the agreements are analyzed with consider-
ation given to the particular industry and the historical implica-
tions of the imposition.21
The distinct characteristics of amateur and professional
sports do not neatly fit into the per se categories. Professional
baseball is favored with a complete exemption from antitrust
lo See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972); 7 PHILLIP E.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 1510, at 414 (1986); THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASIcs
1.03[3] (1997); Susan Marie Kozik, Note, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board. of
Regents of the Univ. of Okla. and Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass'n, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984), 61
CIH-KENT L. REV. 593, 595 nn.19-25 (1985); Christopher L. Chin, Comment, Illegal Proce-
dures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the Student Athlete, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1213,
1219-20 (June 1993).
11 The Supreme Court developed the rule of reason analysis in Standard Oil v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 94 (1911).
12 National Soc'y of Profl Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
13 Supra note 10. See also, Chin supra note 10, at 1220; Kozik, supra note 10, at 595.
14 "Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation ad-
hered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman
Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements
were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense." United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil, Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940).
15 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
16 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
17 Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
is Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984).
19 National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 692.
20 Id. at 687-88.
21 Id. at 692.
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laws. In a famous 1922 decision written by Justice Holmes, the
Supreme Court held baseball could not be considered interstate
commerce." In spite of substantial criticism, this decision has
never been overturned. As late as 1972, in Flood v. Kuhn,23 the
Court followed precedence and left the issue for Congress to de-
cide. Yet, no other professional sport receives exemption from the
antitrust laws without a specific congressional exemption. The
courts have consistently held professional sports constitute trade
or commerce subject to the antitrust laws.24
Collegiate sports, however, operate in a distinctly different
environment from professional organizations. Amateur players
are not paid for their performances. Therefore, teams have recog-
nized that, in order to play on a level playing field, they must
abide by an agreement to determine the rules of amateur
competition.25
B. The NCAA
The NCAA was formed to regulate the interscholastic athletic
departments of its member universities. The organization is run
as a nonprofit institution comprised of 902 colleges and universi-
ties.2" The purpose of the association 7 is to create rules for ama-
teur2" athletic programs to facilitate fair competition. The
members within the divisions29 have the ability to compete pursu-
ant to uniform rules applicable to all competitors. In recent years,
the NCAA has been subject to criticism for the precise reasons it
was formed. Many member institutions have been sanctioned for
rules violations, which have resulted in severe restraints on the
competitiveness of their athletic programs.30  Although harsh
sanctions have stifled many programs and resulted in millions of
22 Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
23 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). The Court relied on stare decisis and
upheld baseball's exemption from antitrust. Only Congress may now change baseball's an-
titrust status.
24 For a detailed list of the analysis of professional sports and antitrust litigation see
Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust and Sports: Must Competition on the Field Displace Competi-
tion in the Marketplace?, 60 TENN. L. REv. 263 n.19 (Winter 1993).
25 Due to dishonorable activities and brutally violent competitions, the Intercollegiate
Athletic Association of the United States was formed in 1906. The name was changed to
the NCAA in 1910. See Chin, supra note 10, at 1215.
26 Rushin, supra note 1.
27 According to the 1992-93 NCAA Manual, Article 1 of the Constitution states the
organizations purpose is "to promote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness
and sports participation as recreational pursuit." Chin, supra note 10, at 1213 n.6.
28 Rule 2.9 states the principle of amateurism as "participation [which] should be mo-
tivated primarily by education and the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived."
Gems from the NCAA Manual, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 3, 1997.
29 The members are separated into divisions based upon their size and scope of their
athletic departments. Division I-A and I-AA, are colleges with major athletic programs.
Division II and III have less extensive athletic programs. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 89.
30 Supra note 2.
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dollars in lost revenues, few sanctioned universities have filed suit
against the NCAA. Some of the NCAA's rules restricting competi-
tion have been found violative of the antitrust laws.3
Most of the response to the harsh sanctions has come from
affected players, coaches, cheerleaders, fans, concessionaires,
alumni, and boosters who brought actions against the NCAA.32
Courts invariably use the rule of reason analysis to evaluate the
justifications for the restraint, followed by a dismissal of the
claims. The courts reason the NCAA sanctions do not violate the
antitrust laws because the rules are procompetitive and the ap-
plied sanctions are reasonable.
One of the most significant decisions against the NCAA re-
sulted when two universities challenged the NCAA's control of tel-
evision broadcasting of football games in the 1984 United States
Supreme Court case of National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.33 The NCAA re-
quired its members to abide by a television contract with two ma-
jor broadcast networks that limited the number of games any
given team could televise and the amount of revenue each member
could receive per game. When the petitioning universities con-
tracted with another broadcaster, the NCAA threatened sanctions
if the universities proceeded with the contract. 4 The Court held
the NCAA restrictions involved horizontal price fixing and output
limitations, which are characteristics of a traditional cartel
deemed illegal per se.33
However, the Court refused to apply a strict per se analysis.
The rule of reason approach was deemed more appropriate than
the per se test because horizontal restraints were essential for the
31 In Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1152 (5th Cir.
1977), the court recognized the NCAA is not granted a total exemption from the antitrust
laws; however, it did not find the imposed restraint unreasonable. Yet, in Board of Re-
gents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Court found the NCAA unreasonably restrained trade for the
broadcasting rights of member football games.
32 See McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988)
(group of alumni, football players, and cheerleaders); Hennessey, 564 F.2d 1136 (coaches);
Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (football
player); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975)
(hockey player); Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind.
1990) (football player); Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D.
Ariz. 1983) (student athlete players).
33 The University of Oklahoma and University of Georgia entered into a separate con-
tract with another network to broadcast their football games. Since the NCAA required
broadcasting games within their approved plans, they threatened sanctions on the univer-
sities if they complied with the contract. The universities filed suit alleging violations of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
34 One of the arguments the NCAA advanced in support of the regulation was the
adverse effect on live attendance at the games. However, this argument has been dis-
proved. In 1994, football fans set a record attendance of 36,459,896. Ray Waddell, College
Football Attendance Tops 36 Million for 1" Time, AMUSEMENT Bus., Feb. 13, 1995, at 14.
35 See Chin, supra note 10, at 1220; Kozik, supra note 10, at 595. See also Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1984).
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existence of amateur athletics.36 The Court recognized the special
nature inherent in collegiate sports and reasoned that a governing
organization such as the NCAA is necessary to provide rules and
agreements among competitors in order to bring the unique prod-
uct of college football to the marketplace.37 Since the NCAA plays
a vital role in the market for consumer choices as well as the mar-
ket for college athletes, the benefit of the procompetitive effects
outweighed the restraints.
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents focused on the com-
mercial aspect of NCAA rules. It did not decide whether any spe-
cific noncommercial rule was subject to antitrust analysis. 8
Rather, the Court expressly distinguished the television contract
restrictions from eligibility rules, contest rules, and the manner in
which the joint venture operates. 9 The procompetitive effects
were deemed insufficient to justify the restraint on the free mar-
ket.4° The Court stated the restrictions on game broadcasting
were not essential to creating a competitive field and ultimately
decided the restraint was inconsistent with the goal of antitrust
law. Members in a competitive marketplace could have individu-
ally responded to consumer demand. Instead the number of
games was restricted while prices were inflated.
The Fifth Circuit followed this distinction in McCormack v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association, by indicating there is
"some support in the case law"41 that the NCAA's rules, which
have primarily noncommercial objectives, are not subject to anti-
trust analysis. The Court directed its inquiry to the NCAA rules
enforcing the benefits awarded to student athletes. Without de-
ciding whether the rules were amenable to antitrust analysis, the
36 The Court stated, "[W]hat the NCAA and its member institutions market in this
case is competition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of course, this would
be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to create
and define the competition to be marketed." Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
37 Id. at 117. "It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the
NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and
therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics."
38 In McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir.
1988), the court assumed the eligibility rules are subject to antitrust laws, applied the rule
of reason analysis and found the restrictions imposed were reasonable under the circum-
stances. On May 4, 1998, a jury awarded $22 million in back wages, penalties and legal
fees to 1900 assistant coaches. The verdict was then trebled to $66 million under antitrust
law. Kirk Johnson, Assistant Coaches Win N. C.AA Suit; $66 Million Award, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1998, at Al.
39 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
40 A 1995 statistical analysis of the effects of the Board of Regents decision suggested
the universities and the consumer benefited from the free marketability of televised games.
D. Kent Meyers and Ira Horowitz, Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Works Occa-
sionally: Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, A Case in Point, 48
OKLA. L. REv. 669 (Winter 1995).
41 McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343 (citing Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383 and Jones, 392 F.
Supp. at 303).
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Fifth Circuit found the rules were reasonable and did not consti-
tute an antitrust violation.
Most case law alleging restraint of trade against the NCAA
primarily involves plaintiffs other than the member colleges or
universities. Traditionally, parties other than actual members
have not been able to establish an antitrust claim because the par-
ties who are directly harmed, if at all by the NCAA's actions, are
the universities and colleges,42 not the athletes or the fans. The
universities are acutely aware of the NCAA's powerful role and its
ability to shut down their athletic programs. Their reluctance to
make a claim may possibly be due to a fear of repercussions.43 The
attacks on NCAA sanctions have, therefore, been brought indi-
rectly by third parties rather than by the directly impacted
institutions.
The courts have consistently applied a rule of reason analysis
with regard to noncommercial restraints.44 In the past, the courts
42 When alumni, football players and cheerleaders challenged the NCAA suspension
penalty, the court noted it was a worthwhile college try, however, "SMU... remains the
party most directly harmed by the NCAA's actions." McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1342-43.
43 Sanctioned colleges and universities may not sue because of a fear that it is unwise
to further upset a regulatory body, whether private or governmental, which possesses tre-
mendous control over their fate. Consequently, in a famous case, coach Jerry Tarkanian of
the University of Nevada at Las Vegas sued his employer seeking injunctive relief to pre-
clude it from enforcing the proposed NCAA sanctions. He alleged violations of his federal
civil rights and subsequently added the NCAA to the complaint. In 1977, the NCAA ini-
tially concluded coach Tarkanian committed several rules violations. The United States
Supreme Court held in 1988 the NCAA could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because its actions did not constitute state action. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). Tarkanian filed a second suit alleging unfair prosecution
when he was forced to resign from UNLV. In 1998, the NCAA agreed to pay Tarkanian
$2.5 million dollars to settle the dispute. The press considered the settlement a victory for
Tarkanian and a blow to the NCAA, "whose authority over college sports has eroded over
the last several decades." The association's executive director, Cedric Dempsey, stated "it
'regrets the 26-year ongoing dispute' with Tarkanian." Additionally, Dempsey said "the
settlement was made for practical reasons: the cost of trial, the likelihood of appeals, the
failure to remove the case out of Las Vegas and losses during several mock trials." How-
ever, Dempsey stated, "All of us need to recognize that our investigative procedures are
continually evolving." "Nevertheless, Dempsey acknowledged that the long case had pro-
duced changes in the association's investigative procedures." Richard Sandomir, Maverick
Coach Wins Battle and Collects From N.CA.A., N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 4, 1998, at Al. Tarkanian
made the statement, "I learned you never want to fight an organization that powerful.
They control the press. They spend more money on public relations in one month than I
make in a lifetime." Tarkanian felt the settlement signified that the NCAA did not have
any evidence to substantiate their claim. He stated, "We had some minor violations, which
everybody has, things we weren't aware of. The way the rules are, they're so complex,
everybody has violated them." Larry Stewart, Tarkanian, NCAA Settle for $2.5 Million,
L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 2, 1998, at Cl.
44 Courts applying the rule of reason analysis to § 1 antitrust claims for NCAA rule
sanctions include: Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind.
1990) (Notre Dame football player seeking an injunction for reinstatement after becoming
ineligible to play because of entering the pro-football draft); Hennessey v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (rule requiring reduction of particular
coaches to part-time status with severe reduction in pay); McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1338
(SMU alumni, players and cheerleaders protesting penalties imposed for scholarship
violations).
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have focused on whether the procompetitive effect in promoting
college sports outweigh the anticompetitive effects in the mar-
ket.4 In looking at the noncommercial rules, the lower courts
have applied antitrust regulations to the NCAA's involvement in
interstate business.4 6
The results of litigation have allowed the NCAA to promul-
gate and regulate its own rules free of substantive judicial re-
view.4 7 Plaintiffs have been hard-pressed to overcome the burden
of proving that the rules' adverse effects on the free competitive
market outweigh their procompetitive benefits. The inability to
overcome this hurdle is reflected by the courts' reluctance to enter
into the arena of college sports unless there is substantial evi-
dence of an abuse of commercial power. The Ninth Circuit's 1996
decision in Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference exemplifies this
trend.
III. HAIRSTON v. PACIFIC 10 CONFERENCE
A. The Facts of the Case
Appellants are former and current University of Washington
football players. Appellee, the Pacific-10 Conference," is an unin-
corporated association of ten universities situated in California,
Arizona, Oregon and Washington. Newspaper reports by the Se-
45 Courts have found the restrictions are reasonable in deciding whether the restraint
enhanced competition under the rule of reason analysis. See, e.g., McCormack, 845 F.2d at
1338. The NCAA mandated a new by-law where assistant football coaches were relegated
to part-time status with a drastic decrease in pay. Two coaches brought an action to invali-
date the new by-law. The court held the rules were not an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1149. See also supra note 38.
46 Although the NCAA is a nonprofit organization, "when presenting amateur athlet-
ics to a ticket-paying, television-buying public, [it is] engaged in a business venture of far
greater magnitude than the vast majority of 'profit making' enterprises." Hennessey, 564
F.2d at 1149. The Gaines court is in agreement with the position of the Hennessey court
and recognized the NCAA had an annual multimillion dollar budget. Citing Hennessey, the
court noted the business finction of the NCAA, recognizing they are not exempt from anti-
trust regulation simply because their 'objectives are educational and... carried on for the
benefit" of amateur sports. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744.
47 A football player requested an injunction to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing a rule
which made him ineligible to play football in his senior year because he entered the profes-
sional draft. The court stated, "[T]he NCAA rules benefit both players and the public by
regulating college football so as to preserve its amateur appeal. Moreover, this regulation
makes a better 'product' available by maintaining the educational underpinnings of college
football and preserving the stability and integrity of college football programs." The court
denied the player's claim because the NCAA had legitimate business justifications for the
rules in question. The case involved a § 2 monopolization claim. The court likened its anal-
ysis to the rule of reason approach for a § 1 claim. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 746.
48 The Pac-10 is a member of the NCAA. The conference is composed of 10 universi-
ties on the west coast. The association establishes athletic programs, administers athletic
events, and stages conference tournaments. The primary purpose of the conference is to
make certain the members abide by the rules which are promulgated by the NCAA and the
Pac-10. Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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attle Times and the Los Angeles Times49 caused an investigation to
be initiated into the football program at UW ° The Pac-10 and
UW began investigating the alleged infractions of the NCAA
rules.
The Seattle Times reported on November 5, 1992 that star
quarterback Billy Joe Hobert received $50,000 in loans from an
Idaho businessman.5 Within the following month, the Los Angeles
Times followed up with a series of reports exposing various other
NCAA rules violations.52 After the eight-month investigation by
the UW53 and the Pac-10, officials found violations had occurred.
Hobert was suspended by the university and subsequently barred
from eligibility to play amateur football.54
The investigation55 resulted in the Pac-10 sanctioning the UW
football team for recruiting violations. The following penalties
were imposed: "(1) a two-year bowl ban covering the 1993 and
1994 seasons; (2) a one-year television revenue ban; (3) a limit of
15 football scholarships for the 1994-95 and the 1995-96 academic
years; (4) a reduction in the number of permissible football
49 For a chronological listing of the events leading to the Pac-10 penalties, see Pacific
10 Sanctions Washington, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at C8.
50 The UTW football team is known as the Huskies. Washington Penalties May be Com-
pounded, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1994, at C1.
51 Charles Rice, a nuclear engineer with no affiliation to the UTW, made the loan to
Hobert. He was asked by his son-in law to help out a friend. A contract was formed without
assets as collateral or a regular payment schedule, but a full demand payment could be
called at any time. Hobert blew the money in three months on paying existing bills, enter-
taining friends, and purchasing a stereo system, cars and guns. Although Hobert had led
the team to a Rose Bowl victory at the time he signed the loan, the ensuing year's perform-
ance was mediocre. Tom Farrey and Eric Nadler, Huskies' Hobert Got $50,000 Loan-
Money from Businessman Spent in Spree, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at Al.
52 The major violations found were: "Improper employment of football and basketball
players by boosters during summers and holidays. Improper unsecured loans of $50,000
received by then starting quarterback Billy Joe Hobert, now a rookie with the Los Angeles
Raiders. Free meals and excessive wages provided to football players by boosters. Illegal
recruiting inducements by boosters. Illegal recruiting contracts by boosters. Improper use
of meal expenses by student hosts on official recruiting visits." Therefore, the allegations
evidenced "a lack of institutional control over the football program." Elliott Almond, Wash-
ington Huskies Get Tough Pac 10 Penalties, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at Al.
53 The UW hired attorneys Mike Glazier and Rick Evrard, from Overland Park, Kan-
sas, to conduct an independent review. Glazier and Evrard formerly worked in the NCAA
enforcement department. Danny Robbins and Elliot Almond, Washington Admits to Viola-
tions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at Cl.
54 The loan Hobert received was a violation of the rule that did not allow athletes to
obtain benefits that were not available to other students. The rule states "a student-ath-
lete may not receive preferential treatment, benefits or services for his or her athletics
reputation or skill or payback potential as a future professional athlete." Farrey and Nad-
ler, supra note 51.
55 The conference alleged 24 violations. Tom Farrey, No Bowl Play for Huskies, THE
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at Al. The Pac-10 reviewed the violations and imposed
their own sanctions. The NCAA conducted its own review of the case to determine if it
would impose stricter penalties. Although, the NCAA cannot reduce the sanctions it usu-
ally ratifies the conference penalties. Almond, supra note 52.
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recruiting visits from 70 to 35 in 1993-94 and to 40 in 1994-95;
and (5) a two-year probationary period."56
In an attempt to have the sanctions lifted, players and fans
filed a complaint against the Pac-10. The players' complaint al-
leged violations of the antitrust laws under § 1 of the Sherman Act
and breach of contract. The players asked the court for injunctive
relief and damages, arguing the sanctions imposed were not pro-
portionate to UW's violations of the NCAA rules. Additionally,
the players claimed the sanctions were based on a conspiracy by
the Pac-10 to shut down the UW football program, thereby creat-
ing a competitive edge for the remaining teams.
The Pac-10 filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
players lacked constitutional and antitrust standing. The district
court disallowed the breach of contract claim because the "players
were not intended third-party beneficiaries of the contract be-
tween and among Pac-10 member schools."" However, the court
denied the Pac-10's motion on the standing issue.58
The Pac-10 subsequently moved for summary judgment,
claiming there was insufficient evidence of the players' conspiracy
allegation. In support of its motion, the Pac-10 claimed the play-
ers lacked antitrust standing to bring the lawsuit. Because the
players had failed to establish an antitrust violation, the court
found it unnecessary to decide the antitrust standing issue.59 The
ruling relied on the players' failure to state specific facts of an an-
ticompetitive conspiracy between the member teams or the Pac-10
and the NCAA. The district court dismissed the players' claim,
granting the Pac-10's motion for summary judgment. The court
held, after completion of discovery, the players failed to provide
any evidence the penalties were excessively harsh.6 °
B. The Majority Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision on the grounds that the players had failed to establish a
violation of the antitrust laws. The court based its ruling on its
earlier decision in Bhan v. NME Hospitals, which held a § 1 claim
requires: "1) that there was a contract, combination, or conspir-
acy; 2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under
56 Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1317 (9th Cir. 1996).
57 Id. at 1318.
58 Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
59 Areeda and Hovenkamp have observed: "When a court concludes that no violation
has occurred, it has no occasion to consider [antitrust] standing." 2 Phillip E. Areeda and
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, I 360f (rev. ed. 1995).
6o Hairston, 893 F. Supp. at 1496.
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either a per se rule of illegality or a rule of reason analysis; and 3)
that the restraint affected interstate commerce."61
A horizontal restraint exists when the NCAA members create
an agreement as to how they will compete against each other.6 2
The court cited the Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents to
support its conclusion. The contract, combination, or conspiracy
requirement is the agreement between the member schools. The
parties also did not dispute the restraint affected interstate com-
merce, therefore fulfilling another requirement. Thus, the court
focused on the final requirement: whether the penalties imposed
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.
The rule of reason analysis was applied to analyze the sanc-
tions imposed on the UW. The harm to competition by the sanc-
tions was balanced against the procompetitive effects of the rules.
Initially, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the re-
straint produces significant anticompetitive effects within the rel-
evant sport and geographic markets. If the plaintiff meets this
burden, the defendant must then come forward with evidence of
the restraint's procompetitive effects. Upon a reasonable showing
by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove legitimate objectives
could have been achieved in a substantially less restrictive
manner.
63
Initially, the players showed the restraint of being banned
from participating in future bowl games had significant anticom-
petitive effects on college football and the geographic market.
However, the Pac-10 produced evidence to support the procompe-
titive effects of requiring certain guidelines and sanctions for rule
violations. Therefore, it was up to the players to produce evidence
the sanctions could have been imposed in a substantially less re-
strictive manner.
Even if the penalties were grossly disproportionate to the
UW's violations, the players could not meet their burden by show-
ing the penalties were disproportionate. They were further re-
quired to provide an appropriate alternative solution. The players
relied on evidence from a report by Robert Aronson, a University
of Washington professor, who conducted an analysis of the sanc-
tions in comparison to other institutions. However, the court con-
cluded his testimony actually supported the premise that the
penalties were appropriate. In addition, when the NCAA subse-
quently reviewed the violations, they reported the Pac-10 sanc-
tions were too lenient. The court concluded the players failed to
61 Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991).
62 The Court found the members of the NCAA formed a horizontal restraint, since
there was an agreement among competitors. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99.
63 Bhan, 929 F.2d at 1413.
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show how the sanctions imposed on the UW amounted to an un-
reasonable restraint of trade.
The players' claim for breach of contract as third-party benefi-
ciaries also failed. In order for the players to have been consid-
ered third-party beneficiaries to the contract, Washington law
requires a showing that the Pac-10 "intended" to assume a direct
obligation to the players at the time the contract was formed.64
"[T]he test of intent is an objective one; the key is not whether the
contracting parties had an altruistic motive or desire to benefit
the third party, but rather 'whether [the] performance under the
contract would necessarily and directly benefit' that party."65 The
players also relied on the Pac-10 Constitution in support of their
argument that a contract was formed. The court cited to the Pac-
10 Constitution which states its purpose is "to enrich and balance
the athletic and educational experiences of student-athletes at its
member institutions, [and] to enhance athletic and academic in-
tegrity among its members."6 Relying on the district court's con-
clusion that the language of the league Constitution was "vague,
hortatory pronouncements,"67 the court concluded the contract
was created between the conference and its members, not between
the conference and the players.
C. The Concurring Opinion
The majority opinion concluded there was no evidence of an
antitrust violation. Judge Trott argued, although the majority
was correct in its analysis of the failed antitrust claim, the issue of
the players' standing was not resolved.68 The concurring opinion
stated that leaving the district court decision as it stood would
encourage antitrust lawsuits "every time a player feels injured by
a conference sanction."6 Judge Trott did not want to invite law-
suits from those who argued the Pac-10 should have imposed dif-
ferent penalties. Although the players were unable to play in the
bowl games, the UW incurred the direct injury inflicted by the
sanctions. Therefore, only the UW should have been allowed to
assert the claim.
64 Postlewait Constr. Inc. v. Great Am. Ins., 720 P.2d 805, 806 (Wash. 1986).
65 Id. at 806-7.
66 Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996).
67 The vague and hortatory language referred to is in the Pac-10's general statement
extolling the values of academics along with the high standards for the mission of achieving
the reputation and integrity of the athletic programs. Id.
68 The concurrence relied on the district court's conclusion. Id. at 1320-21.
69 Id. at 1321.
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IV. RULE OF REASON
A. The Court Defers to the Pac-10 Rules as Reasonable
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the antitrust issue with perfunc-
tory ease. The court offered no precedence to support its determi-
nation regarding the NCAA and similar amateur associations.7 °
Instead, the decision is indicative of the judicial reluctance to
meaningfully balance the positive objectives of the NCAA with the
possible resulting erroneous harms. As in many previous deci-
sions, the judiciary views the Pac-10 as a traditional organization
vital to collegiate sports.
The Ninth Circuit succinctly concluded the sanctions were
reasonable. The court neither analyzed the role of the Pac-10 or
the NCAA, nor supported its ruling with an analysis of the
procompetitive effects of the association. Instead, the court relied
on the established premise of the association's procompetitive ef-
fects in a footnote reference to Board of Regents.71 In analyzing the
issue, the court cited the Board of Regents' conclusion, "the integ-
rity of the 'product' cannot be preserved except by mutual agree-
ment . . .".72 The Supreme Court recognized cooperation is
essential if the competition the "member institutions seek to mar-
ket is to be preserved."73
70 See, e.g., McCormack v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.
1988) (SMU alumni, players and cheerleaders failed in antitrust claim under rule of rea-
son analysis); Justice v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983)
(court did not find the group boycott amounted to a per se antitrust claim, but must be
looked at by the rule of reason analysis because rules are essential if sports are to survive);
Jones, 392 F. Supp. 295 (players suit against the NCAA eligibility rules failed where the
rules were held not subject to antitrust scrutiny); Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (rules were found to have procompetitive effects
since they promote college football as an amateur sport); Gaines v. National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (although players claims were based on § 2
of the Sherman Act, the rules were deemed overwhelmingly procompetitive); Hennessey v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1152 (5th Cir. 1977) (assistant coaches
reduced to part-time status did not establish an unreasonable restraint).
71 The quote cited in footnote 4 has been used in similar cases involving the NCAA.
See Hairston, 101 F.3d at 1319 n.4 and McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1344.
The Court in Board of Regents stated:
[Tihe NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college football. The
identification of this "product" with an academic tradition differentiates college
football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might
otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to
preserve the character and quality of the "product," athletes must not be paid,
must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the "product"
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such
restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college
football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed
which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen
consumer choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also those avail-
able to athletes-and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-2.
72 468 U.S. at 102.
73 Id. at 117.
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When a claim is based on an analysis of the NCAA noncom-
mercial rules and sanctions, courts have not found an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade. The Supreme Court expressly addressed
this issue when it stated, "[I]t is reasonable to assume that most of
the regulatory controls of the NCAA are [a] justifiable means of
fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and there-
fore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in inter-
collegiate athletics. 7' Therefore, noncommercial regulatory rules,
such as contest conditions and participant eligibility, are justifi-
able since they fit into the procompetitive mold of enhancing the
appeal of college sports to the public.75
There are several reasons why the courts defer to the NCAA.
Procompetitive effects are evidenced in the organization of rules,
which brings the game of college football to the marketplace. The
NCAA is recognized as promulgating the rules of competition by
which members must abide. In McCormack v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, the Fifth Circuit stated the NCAA would not
be able to market the "contests between competing institutions"
without defining and agreeing upon rules.76 Without a means of
bringing these teams together on a level playing field, there would
be chaos in intercollegiate competitions. The court focuses on the
NCAA's goal of creating similar competitive advantages for divi-
sional teams, so that there will not be a dominant faction created
by unfair advantage.
In Hairston, the court should have analyzed the Pac-10 situa-
tion in greater depth than that of the NCAA. The Pac-10 has
more potential than the NCAA for actually violating the antitrust
laws by using league discipline as a screen to disadvantage suc-
cessful competitors. Unlike the NCAA, the Pac-10 member
schools directly benefit by having the sanctions applied. Prior to
the sanctions, the UW was a ranking champion. Once the sanc-
tions were imposed the remaining teams had a greater likelihood
of achieving a Rose Bowl bid or possibly a national championship,
because the UW would be temporarily ineligible and would be at a
competitive disadvantage for years to come.77 Instead, the court
analogized the Pac-10 to the NCAA without any further inquiry.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 In McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1342, the court cited Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
77 The NCAA sanctions have an impact on competitions for years to come. "NCAA
would better serve college football by making disparate judgments. For instance, Miami,
with its loss of 24 football scholarships for the next two years, is paying a much higher price
than Auburn did for its transgressions two years ago, which resulted in a loss of only six
scholarships in three years. To be sure, Auburn was collared with a two-year bowl ban and
a one-year TV moratorium, in contrast to Miami's lesser sanctions in these areas. But the
heart of college football's future is new recruits." Thomas V. DiBacco, Apply Rules Evenly,
USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 1995 at A10.
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The court examined the restraint to determine whether the
"harm to [the] competition outweighs the restraint's procompeti-
tive effects."" The Ninth Circuit placed the burden of proof upon
the plaintiff to show the anticompetitive effects of the restraint.
The players successfully showed the Pac-10 sanctions imposed an-
ticompetitive effects on the UW. However, the Pac-10 highlighted
the procompetitive effects of the rules. The Ninth Circuit summa-
rily accepted the significant advantages of the Pac-10's procompe-
titive effects without conducting further analysis or offering
additional support for its conclusion.
B. Overcoming the Sanctions' Reasonableness
The court recognized the Pac-10 sanctions had an anticompe-
titive impact. Nevertheless, the plaintiff still could not overcome
the procompetitive effects argument. The Pac-10 had little diffi-
culty showing the significant procompetitive effects of the agree-
ment with the member teams. Unless the sanctions had
unreasonable economic implications or could have been achieved
in a less restrictive manner, the procompetitive effects were recog-
nized as reasonable. The plaintiff was unable to show the sanc-
tions were unreasonable or could have been applied in a
substantially less restrictive manner.
Following the application of the rule of reason analysis, the
court narrowed the issue to decide whether the sanctions created
an unreasonable restraint of trade. The Ninth Circuit required
evidence to support the proposition the sanctions may be imposed
in a substantially less restrictive manner. This requirement has
effectively created an insurmountable burden for plaintiffs bring-
ing suit against the NCAA. The courts have consistently been un-
willing to look at the way the NCAA governs without a clear
indication the rules are directed at the individual plaintiffs.
In order to bring a viable antitrust claim, plaintiffs need to
establish how the sanctions could have been applied in a less re-
strictive manner. The Ninth Circuit's ruling typifies the plaintiffs
difficulty in overcoming the burden because the claim would re-
quire substantial evidence of alternative means to achieve the
NCAA's purpose. In effect, the court is asking for evidence sup-
porting an organizational overhaul of the NCAA system.7 9 The
Ninth Circuit's ruling once again shows the court's reluctance to
seriously question the NCAA's operations.
78 Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1996).
79 "It is not judicial business to tell a voluntary athletic association how best to formu-
late or enforce its rules." Shelton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1197, 1198
(9th Cir. 1976). See, e.g., Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules,
105 H v. L. REv. 1299, 1305 (April 1992).
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C. Piercing the Role of the NCAA
The judicial decisions consistently support the NCAA's posi-
tion by deferring to the association when noncommercial restric-
tions are involved. The court has effectively allowed the NCAA to
hide behind the traditional purpose of the association, insulating
the organization from meaningful judicial scrutiny. However, due
to the increased commercialization and popularity of college
sports, it is questionable whether the regulations exist solely for
the purpose of protecting the student athletes.8 °
By simply adhering to the recognized advantages of the
NCAA, the court has not been willing to look at whether the
NCAA has become too powerful an association. The courts are re-
fusing to accept this challenge, particularly in claims that do not
involve the member universities or colleges. A definitive state-
ment of the antitrust implications of noneconomic NCAA regula-
tions will require suit by its members. However, since athletic
departments bring in millions of dollars in revenue,"' the universi-
ties and colleges are reluctant to change the status quo unless
they can foresee a more equitable alternative approach.
Assuming the NCAA possesses market power, those challeng-
ing any restraint will still need to prove the harmful effects of the
restraint outweigh its procompetitive benefits. In a district court
case where a player tried to restore his eligibility status, the court
stated that, when a defendant "claims to have acted with a
procompetitive purpose, the challenged restraint must bear some
nexus to that purpose for the claim to be credible." 2
The call for reform has initiated the creation of numerous
models for changing the existing college athletic system. 3 The
NCAA is painfully aware of the public's negative perceptions of its
overpowering role in college sports.8 4 As an attempt to ward off
government imposed regulations, the NCAA has recognized the
80 In order to prevail on an antitrust claim, student athletes must prove the NCAA
has commercial motives and is not an organization with educational goals. "[W]ithout the
NCAA's educational rationale to fall back on, courts would not apply relaxed scrutiny, and
would find many regulations to be per se invalid." Chin, supra note 10, at 1244.
81 Supra note 3.
82 Bank v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.Supp. 850, 860 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
83 As a proponent of NCAA academic and financial reforms, academic and economic
areas should be targeted for changes. Chin, supra note 10, at 1245. The NCAA options
consist of three plans: Plan A: entering the free-enterprise system; Plan B: Calling for the
student athletes having the same rights to loans and gifts as other students; Plan C: Re-
serving a percentage of the gross for the players. No matter which plan is adopted in order
to make any significant improvements, the universities need simply limit the number of
scholarships and eligible players with a good-sportsmanship code. Bob Oates, The Big
Steal, L.A. TrMEs, Oct. 3, 1993, at C9.
84 Some of the public perceptions include: there are special admittance standards for
student athletes, coaches are overpaid and cheat, and there is a lack of due process for
eligibility rules. Linda Deckard, NCAA Exec Director Urges Preparation for Dramatic
Changes, AMUSEMENT Bus., Jan. 13, 1992, at 1. The NCAA bureaucracy is "widely per-
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importance of implementing drastic changes.85 However, the
Ninth Circuit's ruling makes it clear the court will not provide the
forum for reassessing the NCAA's role in collegiate sports.
These cases create an interesting anomaly under antitrust
law. Courts have generally closely scrutinized extrajudicial pri-
vate regulatory agencies, which set rules affecting competition
and then enforce them through internal disciplinary proceed-
ings. 6 Yet, the courts currently defer to a private agency, giving it
carte blanche authority to regulate intercollegiate sports in the
United States. Instead of viewing the case of Board of Regents as
a warning sign indicating the NCAA warrants closer judicial scru-
tiny, the courts have treated the NCAA as a commercial aberra-
tion and defer to the agency's regulatory activities. Yet, the
NCAA is acting like a traditional cartel by fixing prices and limit-
ing output. Such power can easily be abused without adequate
judicial review.87
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Hairston foreclosed a challenge
to the association governing collegiate sports. Relying on the rea-
soning that the NCAA plays an important role in bringing the
competitions between collegiate teams to the consumer fans, the
court deferred to the procompetitive effects of the association in-
stead of focusing on the restraints. This judicial deference is un-
derstandable in light of the need for an organization to
promulgate and enforce the rules of amateur athletics. These or-
ganizations face a perhaps insurmountable task in attempting to
curb the activities of overzealous coaches, fans, unscrupulous
agents, and young impressionable athletes. Yet, courts should
recognize the sanctions by the supervisory bodies might have a
disproportionate impact on otherwise innocent schools, athletes,
and fans. There needs to be a balance between the laudable ef-
forts of the NCAA and the rights of the universities and athletes.
The current rules essentially provide no weight to the claims of
the innocent athletes.
ceived to be cold, vindictive and bungling." William F. Reed, It's the Rules, Stupid!, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 24, 1993, at 72.
85 Sports Illustrated reported that Executive Director Cedric Dempsey seems "deter-
mined to bring the NCAA rule book into a closer relationship with reality, to 'take.a hard
look at deregulation and rais[e] the sensitivity level of our group to some of the contradic-
tions in our rules.'" Kostya Kennedy, Hopeful Signs in the NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
June 24, 1996, at 19.
86 See especially Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465
(1941). "[This] combination is in reality an extra-governmental agency, which prescribes
rules for the regulation and restraint of interstate commerce, and provides extra-judicial
tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches upon the
power of the national legislature and violates the statue.'"
87 Cf. Allied Tube & Conduct Corp. v. Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
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The interplay between college and professional athletes and
the excitement of intercollegiate competition continues to attract a
variety of spectators. Enormous revenues are generated by the
collegiate athletic arena. The NCAA's decisions may have a dra-
matic impact on the athlete and financial success of a college's
athletic program. However, the judiciary views the Pac-10 as a
traditional organization vital to collegiate sports. Consequently,
courts have been unwilling to entertain antitrust disputes involv-
ing the NCAA, in effect granting a private organization carte
blanche authority over substantial commerce. Antitrust claims
against the NCAA require sufficient evidence the sanctions could
be imposed in a substantially less restrictive manner. This bur-
den has proven impossible to overcome.
There are two possible solutions. Congress could take the ini-
tiative and establish clear regulations in the area. Otherwise, the
judicial system could remedy the current problem itself by provid-
ing athletes access to bring a legitimate claim. In the meantime,
aggrieved parties, such as athletes, do not have a day in court to
assert their claim that the NCAA penalties may be arbitrary, ca-
pricious, discriminatory, disproportionate or vindictive.
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